-for their thoughtful and detailed engagement with my work. I learned from their essays, even when I disagreed, and I also found much that I agree with. In what follows, I shall focus mainly on the remaining points of scholarly disagreement, ones where further progress might be made or where I think my original view of the matter still has some merit, the criticisms notwithstanding. I shall start by addressing the essay by Green, which takes up my interpretation of the American Legal Realists (hereafter "Realists"). I shall then turn to broader methodological issues in jurisprudence that arise in the essays by Greenberg (though his is also related to the issue of how to understand Realism) and Dickson.
the passages he cites to show that Llewellyn ever held it, from the second edition of The Bramble Bush, refer not to the "decision theory," but to the claims about "predicting" what courts will do.
14 Green takes issue with my claim that it is obviously anachronistic to read the Realists as proferringproffering claims about the "concept" of law, on the grounds that even John Austin was interested in a "definition of positive law." Green circa nn. 91-92. This. This is unpersuasive on two counts: first, it would require a showing that the American Realists were influenced by the Austinian approach; and second, Hart's program of conceptual analysis was not supposed to be definitional, as Hart never tired of emphasizing. 5 question at issue, in any case, is whether it is necessary to make sense of the jurisprudence of most
Realists to saddle them with a commitment to the prediction theory, and, on this score, as I read him, Green agrees with me that it is not: "since the prediction theory is a non-standard theory of law, Leiter's observation that the realists did not employ it when making claims about legal indeterminacy applies." 17 Green's ambitious attempt to square the "prediction theory" with Hartian positivism stalls over the problem that the "prediction theory" does not appear to have any room for the internal point of view, as Green appears to recognize. 18 He correctly concludes that we should understand Realists like Cohen (and perhaps Cook) as proposing a reforming definition of the concept of law, 19 though the reasons to think such a reform worthwhile are not addressed, and would, in any case, be a subject for a different day.
Reply to Mark Greenberg
In Naturalizing Jurisprudence, I replied 20 to Greenberg's as-of-then unpublished essay on the analogy between Quine's argument for naturalized epistemology and the Realist argument for naturalizing the theory of adjudication (Greenberg's originaly essay is, happily, now published in this volume). Greenberg's new essay here replies to my reply, and I fear that on certain issues (in particular, whether there is an analogy between Realism and Quine's argument for naturalized epistemology) we would be well past the point of diminishing returns were my sur-reply to Greenberg's reply to my reply to his original essay go on at a length commensurate to his reply to my reply! Yet Greenberg's new 17 Green, circa n. 131. 18 Green circa nn. 115, 123.
19 Green circa n. 126
20 Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 112-118.
essay-which will be my focus here--raises some issues that do merit more extended discussion, and I will devote most of my space to those.
I'll start with a few brief words about the old issue. Greenberg and I discussed these issues at some length during his year in Austin in 2007, and I believed, and Greenberg confirms, 21 that we had reached a kind of rapprochement: namely, that there are clear analogies between Quine's argument for naturalizing epistemology and the Realist argument for a causal-explanatory theory of judicial decisionmaking, but there are also ways in which the projects are disanalogous, depending on what one emphasizes. The analogy between the Realist argument and Quine's attack on foundationalism in epistemology is straightforward:
22
: Quine suggested that if the foundationalist project of grounding the special epistemic status of science in sense experience failed (as he argued it did, the upshot of his semantic and confirmation holism), then we might as well replace that project with a naturalized kin, one in which we explore the causal relationship between inputs (sense experience) and theoretical output (the theories of science). So, too, the Realists (on my account) suggest that if we can't justify judicial decisions (the outputs) on the basis of the inputs (fact and legal reasons), then we might as well examine the causal-explanatory relation between the two relata. I invoked Quine's argument for naturalized epistemology, by the way, not because I thought most philosophers agreed with Quine (Greenberg seems unduly impressed by current consensus on this and other matters 23 ), but because it was an example familiar to philosophers of an argumentative strategy which would allow us to 21 As Greenberg wrote to me subsequent to sending me his second essay (and gave me permission to quote): "I do certainly agree that there are levels of description at which there are analogies."
22 See Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 34-46, 63-64. 23 He says, e.g., that "Quine's arguments are notoriously inadequate to support" his replacement naturalism and that "normative epistemology has flourished" since Quine. Greenberg, *first page+ and notes 2 and 3 (emphasis added). Later, he claims that there is a "widespread recognition of the mismatch between Quine's arguments and his replacement proposal…." Greenberg, p. __ n. fact about Anglophone philosophy, also "flourishing," in the sense of proliferating, but it's hard to believe anyone really thinks that has any bearing on whether that philosophical enterprise is sterile or fruitful. Greenberg, alas, repeats the same form of "argument" with respect to legal philosophy: again, he notes-citing himself, Marmor, and Shapiro, among others-that normative projects about (as he puts it in Dworkin-speak , so there would be, on this reading, no puzzle about the relationship between the "grounds of legal content" and "the content of the law": the former fix the latter, unless indeterminate. Greenberg's real claim is that the Dworkin of Law's Empire is not necessarily committed to the rightanswer thesis (the earlier Dworkin obviously is, though Greenberg doesn't concede the point quite that plainly). I rather agree with Greenberg that Dworkin "is most concerned to establish…that law depends in a particular way on morality" and that "the right-answer thesis…is a downstream consequence of his overall theory of law in conjunction with his view about morality" 44 So far, this is just a complicated admission that Dworkin accepts a Foundationalist Story about adjudication; the best Greenberg can do 41 A word in passing about Greenberg's repeated confusion about what I said about "predicting" judicial decisions. See Greenberg, pp. __-__. I did not attribute an interest in predicting judicial decisions to anyone other than the Realists. The Realists were practical folks, thinking about the needs of lawyers, and so they thought being able to reliable predict judicial behavior would be useful. I realize that this view is not shared by other legal philosophers, and I did not claim otherwise. I can conclude, happily, on a more positive note. It seems to me that Greenberg's metareflections about naturalism in philosophy are mostly sensible, at least as I interpret them. I agree that naturalism in philosophy is motivated by the thought that "it makes sense to copy the most successful explanatory strategy we have," and this entails both positive (try to emulate successful paradigms of scientific explanation) and negative (don't invoke as explanatory properties that have no standing in the successful sciences) morals for philosophical practice. 54 I agree that "we should be cautious about constraints imposed for the negative" reason, since "it is easy to mistake a transient scientific movement for the true scientific methodology" 55 (Against that note of caution, however, I would point out that there are fewer transient scientific fads than philosophical ones, so if one really had to choose, it is not obvious that we should opt for the 'philosophical' one.) I also agree that "imposing strong naturalistic constraints motivated by scruples about unreduced properties can diminish the fruitfulness of our explanations," 56 but it is important to emphasize that this is no part of my naturalistic project in legal or moral philosophy (especially through my work on Nietzsche). Indeed, I criticize Quine's behaviorism precisely on this score, 57 namely that, as Greenberg puts it, "*h+igh-level sciences routinely Of course, law is not a natural kind like water or wolverine, since it has no distinctive microconstitution, one that could be specified by one of the natural sciences. But if "law" can not be individuated by its natural constitution, then the question arises why a human artifact, like law, should be thought to have an essential constitution at all? 68 Precisely because Hermeneutic Concepts figure in human self-understandings, it turns out that all of them have been resistant to robust or stable analysis in terms of their essential characteristics, or so the history of philosophy for the last two thousand years suggests. I would not want to be a slave to fashion, to be sure, but two thousand years, at least in matters philosophical, does seem like a long time. As Dickson notes, it does appear "startling" to conclude "that theoretical inquiry regarding a familiar and actually existing social institution having far- Dickson's, in the passage just quoted. As Hart aptly observed in "The Postscript," the "starting-point"
for his task in The Concept of Law was "the widespread common knowledge of the salient features of a modern municipal legal system which on page 3 of this book I attribute to any educated man," 72 and thus the argument of the book is replete with appeals, explicit and implicit, to what "any educated man" would intuitively recognize: e.g., that there is a difference between having an obligation and being obliged to do something; or that legal rules can persist in force after the demise of the sovereign who first promulgated them; and so on. He is not alone in that approach. Just to take one of many possible examples, Joseph Raz claims, explicitly, that one of the two main arguments for the "sources thesis" is that it "reflects and explicates our conception of law," where this is, presumably, the conception of law held, however inchoately, by the educated man familiar with a modern municipal legal system. Hart and Raz never adduce any evidence of what "any educated man" knows or believes, but in that regard they are no different than traditional epistemologists or philosophers of language appealing to "ordinary" intuitions about knowledge or reference. No one has thought more carefully about methodological issues in jurisprudence than Julie
Dickson, so I hope these thoughts in reply to her criticisms will stimulate her further work on the subject. 73 Dickson, p. __ [near end]
